Ukraine rare earth deposits span 22 of the 34 minerals the European Union classifies as critical, including lanthanum, cerium, neodymium, samarium, gadolinium, dysprosium, yttrium and scandium. The country has zero commercially operational rare earth mines today, and the geological data underpinning most estimates of that potential is Soviet-era, 30 to 60 years old, and considered inadequate for commercial assessment by Ukraine’s own former Geological Survey head.
Ukraine Rare Earth Deposits: Mazurivske and Azov
The country’s REE-bearing sites are concentrated in the Ukrainian Shield formation. The Mazurivske deposit in the Zhytomyr region is among the largest single REE ore reserves identified in Ukraine. The Azov deposit in Donetsk region holds rare earths intertwined with titanium and zirconium, a mineralogical complexity that adds processing cost on top of the extraction challenge.
Ukraine also holds substantial non-REE critical mineral wealth relevant to the same investment conversation: proven graphite reserves of roughly 19 million tonnes (placing it among the top five globally), around 7% of European titanium supply, and roughly a third of Europe’s known lithium deposits, alongside beryllium and uranium. This broader portfolio is one reason Ukraine features in regional supply chain discussions alongside Europe’s wider critical minerals strategy, even though its REE output today is effectively zero.
The US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund
The US and Ukraine signed an agreement establishing the US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund on 30 April 2025, with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent signing for the US and First Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko for Ukraine. Under the deal, Ukraine contributes 50% of royalties, rents and licence fees from new natural resource projects only. Existing producers such as Naftogaz and Ukrnafta are exempt, and the agreement carries no debt-repayment obligation, a substantial softening from the $500 billion repayment figure Trump initially proposed and Zelenskyy rejected in February 2025.
Ukraine retains full ownership and sovereignty over its resources. The US receives preferential offtake rights on new licences, not ownership of the resources themselves. The agreed mineral list runs to 55 entries with room to add more, and the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) is the US-side partner, with its reauthorisation folded into the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act.
The fund’s board reached final administrative consensus in December 2025, and the fund is now fully operational, having begun diligencing its first investments in 2026, according to CSIS Critical Minerals Security Program analysis. That marks a meaningful step beyond the framework-signing stage, though translating diligence into producing assets, particularly in rare earths specifically, remains a multi-year proposition.
The Occupation Problem
Roughly 40% of Ukraine’s mineral assets sit in Russian-occupied territory, according to 2026 estimates; some earlier 2025 reporting put REE deposits specifically as high as half. Novopoltavske, the best-mapped REE-relevant field in the country, sits on the wrong side of the front line, and two of the most-cited lithium projects face the same problem. This is a structural constraint on the broader geopolitics of rare earth supply, not an incidental one: unlocking the deal’s value is contingent on how the war resolves, and no amount of fund capitalisation changes that while the front line holds.
The deal’s framing has drawn criticism in parts of the commentary, with some characterising it as reflecting a transactional dynamic weighted toward US interests rather than an uncontested partnership of equals. Ukrainian officials have pushed back on that characterisation, pointing to the retained sovereignty and offtake-only (not ownership) terms as evidence the final text moved materially from earlier, harsher drafts.
2026 Progress: Mapping and Drilling
Ukraine is digitising roughly 60,000 Soviet-era geological documents into a single archive with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Core drilling restarted in January 2026, focused on ore occurrences for titanium, uranium, germanium, graphite, tungsten, vanadium and tantalum. Wartime conditions rule out methods such as LiDAR, so drilling targets sites with existing baseline data rather than fresh exploration ground. The longer-term ambition is a domestic analytical laboratory and a mapping programme modelled on the USGS Earth Mapping Resources Initiative.
The Outlook for Ukraine Rare Earth Development
China controls the large majority of global REE processing capacity, according to USGS Rare Earths Statistics, which remains the core Western strategic rationale for deals of this kind, reinforcing the pressure already visible around Chinese export policy. Ukraine is not the first, or only, country in this courtship: France’s Defence Minister held bilateral talks with Kyiv on REE access from autumn 2024, predating the US agreement, and comparisons are increasingly drawn with how Russia’s own rare earth reserves and Greenland’s deposits under Danish sovereignty are being positioned in the same Western supply chain conversation. For Ukraine specifically, the fund moving from signed framework to active investment diligence in 2026 is a genuine milestone, but geological uncertainty, degraded energy infrastructure, and the occupation of the country’s best-mapped sites mean commercial rare earth production remains a post-war proposition rather than a near-term one.
This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.
Does Ukraine currently produce rare earth elements?
No. Ukraine has zero commercially operational rare earth mines today. Its reserves are considered geologically promising but commercially unproven, since most existing survey data dates to the Soviet era and has not been validated against modern viability standards.
What is the US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund?
It is a jointly managed investment vehicle established by a 2025 agreement between the US and Ukraine, structured around new natural resource projects rather than a transfer of existing assets. Ukraine retains ownership and sovereignty over its resources; the US receives preferential offtake rights on new licences. Full deal mechanics are covered in the article body above.
How much of Ukraine’s rare earth wealth is in Russian-occupied territory?
A significant share, with estimates in the range of 40% of mineral assets generally and higher for rare earths specifically in some assessments. This includes some of the country’s best-mapped deposits, making the resolution of the war a structural precondition for developing much of Ukraine’s rare earth potential.
Where are Ukraine’s main rare earth deposits located?
The two most-cited sites are Mazurivske in the Zhytomyr region and Azov in Donetsk region, both within the Ukrainian Shield formation. Detail on each is covered in the article body above.
Why hasn’t Ukraine developed its rare earth resources already?
A combination of outdated Soviet-era geological data, the ongoing war and associated infrastructure damage, and the concentration of key deposits in contested or occupied territory. Modernising the geological record and restoring energy infrastructure are both prerequisites that predate any question of commercial extraction.
